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CASE COMMENT

THE EMERGENCE OF
CONTEXTUALLY CONSTRAINED PURPOSIVISM
Michael C. Mikulic∗
INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice John Marshall once famously wrote, “It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule.” 1 Chief Justice Marshall was describing the
Supreme Court’s most basic role: determining the meaning of legal
provisions. Yet, despite how doctrinal these lines are, the Court has never
established a uniform method of interpretation. 2 After years of the Court’s
drift towards new textualism, King v. Burwell 3 reaffirms that purposivism
still has relevancy; contextually constrained purposivism is the new trend.

∗ Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2016; Master of Arts,
Vanderbilt University, 2013; Bachelor of Arts, Vanderbilt University, 2012. I would like to
extend my deepest gratitude to Judge Kenneth Ripple for all his invaluable guidance and
direction on this Case Comment.
1 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). In his now famous book,
A Matter of Interpretation, Justice Antonin Scalia quotes Joel Bishop, a renowned
nineteenth century legal writer, who echoed Chief Justice Marshall’s words: “[T]he primary
object of all rules for interpreting statutes is to ascertain the legislative intent; or, exactly,
the meaning which the subject is authorized to understand the legislature intended.”
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (1997)
(alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES
ON THE WRITTEN LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION § 70 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1882)).
2 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1169 (William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (“The hard truth of the matter is that
American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of
statutory interpretation.”); see also SCALIA, supra note 1, at 14 (“Surely this is a sad
commentary: We American judges have no intelligible theory of what we do most.”). For
purposes of this Case Comment, only the judiciary’s interpretation of statutes will be
analyzed.
3 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
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One of the central debates in statutory interpretation is whether judges
should follow the spirit of the law or its letter. 4 Though these two
approaches differ significantly, each ultimately focuses on ascertaining the
congressional intent expressed in a statute.5 At one end of the spectrum, to
follow the spirit of the law means to try and interpret individual statutory
provisions in light of the provision’s larger purpose.6 On this view, judges
care more about why the law was passed, rather than how the law is
communicated through the text. To find the statute’s spirit, judges look to
a wide variety of factors, including language, structure, history surrounding
the enactment of the law, the evil Congress sought to combat by passing
the law, and legislative history. At the other end of the spectrum, to follow
the letter means to look only to the stated text. Congress’s purpose—the
law Congress intended to make—is there in the words. To such textualists,
the plain meaning rule is sacrosanct. 7 If the provision remains vague or
ambiguous, textualist judges look to more text, or the wider provisions
surrounding the ambiguous one at hand. These judges rarely take into
account extra-textual considerations.
In King, the Court grappled with this ideological debate and decided
that, when the spirit and letter of the law directly conflict, the spirit trumps.
The Court employed an almost purely purposivist approach to interpreting

4 See Eyston v. Studd (1573) 75 Eng. Rep. 688, 695, 2 Plowd. 459, 465 (K.B.)
(“Law . . . consists of two parts, viz. of body and soul, the letter of the law is the body of the
law, and the sense and reason of the law is the soul of the law . . . .”); see also JOHN F.
MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 27–29 (2d ed. 2013) (offering an excellent overview of the debate).
5 This Case Comment argues that most judges see their roles as agents of Congress,
tasked with trying to implement the decisions made by Congress. For more on this agency
theory, see Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405, 415 (1989) (“In a democratic system, with an electorally accountable legislature
and separated powers, it is said to be the appropriate and indeed constitutionally prescribed
role of the courts to apply legislative commands . . . .”). Thus, this agency theory of the
Court’s role is said to be most in line with democratic principles of governance. See Letter
from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI 1916–1935,
at 249 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) (“[I]f my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will
help them. It’s my job.”).
6 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 174 (1921)
(“We may figure the task of the judge, if we please, as the task of a translator, the reading of
signs and symbols given from without. None the less, we will not set men to such a task,
unless they have absorbed the spirit, and have filled themselves with a love, of the language
they must read.” (emphasis added)).
7 To see the Court’s affinity for applying the plain meaning rule at the end of the
twentieth century, see Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating
Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 238.
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the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). 8 Instead of looking
only to the plain language of the disputed provision, the Court readily took
into account both the provision’s context—the whole text and structure of
the ACA—and the statute’s implicit purpose. By doing so, the Court
discounted the plain meaning of the specific provision in favor of the
statute’s overall purpose.
Regardless of whether the Court interpreted the provision correctly,
King signals a change in the Court’s methodology of statutory
interpretation. 9 This change harkens back to a classical period of
interpretation where purposivism was the main statutory interpretation
approach. However, the Court in King did not fully embrace classical
purposivism. Instead, it insisted that text still plays an important role, to
such a degree that the Court essentially employed a hybrid approach:
contextually constrained purposivism. 10 In other words, King suggests the
Court has ushered in a new way to read statutes, primarily considering the
purpose of the statute to find the provision’s right meaning, 11 and then
taking into account the statute’s text.
This Case Comment will proceed by first outlining the various
methods of statutory construction used by the Court throughout its history,
leading up to the Court’s implementation of contextually constrained
purposivism in King. It will then provide a summary of the facts and
procedural history of King, thereby setting the stage to explain how the
Court invoked contextually constrained purposivism. Finally, the Case
Comment will discuss some of the positive and negative implications of the
approach.

8 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18,
21, 25–26, 29–31, 35 & 42 U.S.C.).
9 The Court’s new technique in King was not a revolution in statutory interpretation.
Indeed, the Court has long looked to both the text and purpose of a statute to determine a
provision’s meaning. As Chief Justice Roger Taney remarked over 150 years ago, “In
expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence,
but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.” United States v.
Boisdoré’s Heirs, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850). More accurately, the Court’s
technique in King is an evolution in statutory interpretation. The Court utilizes purpose and
text in a new way to find a provision’s meaning. As this Case Comment contends, the Court
primarily looked to purpose, and then to text, to determine meaning.
10 Contextually constrained purposivism—a hybrid term proposed by this Case
Comment—is explained in greater detail in Section I.B. To be fair, another commentator,
Professor Richard M. Re, calls this method “The New Holy Trinity”—named after a case of
the same name that took into account the spirit of the law over the letter. See Richard M.
Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 407, 407–08 (2015).
11 By “right meaning,” this Case Comment means Congress’s originally intended
meaning.
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CONTEXTUALLY CONSTRAINED PURPOSIVISM IN KING

Throughout our nation’s history, the Supreme Court has engaged in
roughly four different methods of statutory interpretation: (1) old
textualism, (2) purposivism, (3) new textualism, and (4) textually
constrained purposivism. The Court has engaged in all four methods (and
variations of each method) at different junctions, and no approach is strictly
constrained to a certain era. However, there has been a general progression
among these four approaches.
Old textualism was used by the Court in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century when, according to Professor Cass Sunstein, “[t]he most
important organizing principle for interpretation was that regulatory
statutes should be construed narrowly—so as to harmonize as much as
possible with principles of private markets and private rights.” 12 Although
the shift from old textualism towards purposivism was likely influenced by
the New Deal and the growth of the administrative state, 13 the primary case
exemplifying purposivism is Holy Trinity Church v. United States 14—
which was decided in 1892. In Holy Trinity, the Court stated, “It is a
familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not
within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of
its makers.” 15 The purposivism exhibited in Holy Trinity is the classic
interpretive approach16 and was the dominant approach of the Court
throughout most of the twentieth century. 17

12 Sunstein, supra note 5, at 408. Professor Sunstein argues that the Court struck
down regulatory statutes because it viewed them as “foreign substances”—new pieces of
law. Id. (citing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 9 (1928) (“The
truth is that many of us, bred in common law traditions, view statutes with a distrust which
we may deplore, but not deny.”)). As examples of old textualism, Sunstein cites Shaw v.
Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879), and Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 117 F. 462,
466 (8th Cir. 1902), rev’d, 196 U.S. 1 (1904). Sunstein, supra 5, at 408 n.5. For a modern
example, see Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1502–03 (2012).
13 Starting in the 1930s and continuing in later cases, the Court abandoned favoring
laissez-faire jurisprudence. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955);
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934). As a result, no longer did the Court attempt to construe statutes narrowly in order to
advance its favorite economic theory. Professor Sunstein generally explains why. See
Sunstein, supra note 5, at 409 (“The demands of the modern administrative state ultimately
made it impossible for courts to sustain a theory of interpretation rooted in nineteenthcentury common law.”).
14 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
15 Id. at 459.
16 See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 4, at 29, 36–44.
17 See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 113.
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Believing that purposivism invites too much discretion for judges to
read their own morals and values into statutes, 18 the new textualist
movement brings back the primacy of the letter of the law. 19 New
textualists, like the late Justice Antonin Scalia 20 and Judge Frank
Easterbrook, 21 start with the premise that this nation is a government of
laws, not men. 22 This means judges do not need to consult external sources
to find out what Congress intended to agree upon—because Congress’s
agreement is expressed in the text of the statute. 23 The fourth method,
textually constrained purposivism, 24 emerged in response to the absurd
results sometimes produced by new textualism. Under the approach of
textually constrained purposivism, the Court first looks to the text of the
provision for meaning. 25 If the text is unambiguous, there is no need for
further analysis: the plain meaning of the text governs. As the Court
explained, “Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether
18 See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 17–18 (“The practical threat [of purposivism] is that,
under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents,
common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their
lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the statutory field.”).
19 See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 4, at 44–60.
20 See Amy Gutmann, Introduction to SCALIA, supra note 1, at vii.
21 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction,
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 60 (1988) (“The words of the statute, and not the intent of
the drafters, are the ‘law.’”).
22 See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 17 (“Government by unexpressed intent is similarly
tyrannical. It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver. That seems to me the
essence of the famous American ideal set forth in the Massachusetts constitution: A
government of laws, not of men. Men may intend what they will; but it is only the laws that
they enact which bind us.”).
23 Unlike purposivists, new textualists outright dismiss the use of legislative history.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 640–56 (1990).
Moreover, new textualists believe that it is almost impossible for judges to discern the one
true purpose of why a statute was passed. Since each of the 535 members of Congress
might have a different reason for approving of (or rejecting) a statute, the best way to
discern Congress’s collective purpose is to look at the statute’s text, which is the only
evidence of Congress’s objectified intent.
24 For more on textually constrained purposivism, see MANNING & STEPHENSON,
supra note 4, at 60–72; Manning, supra note 17. Professor Manning calls textually
constrained purposivism by different names, including “textually-structured purposivism,”
“purpose-sensitive textualis[m],” and “new purposivism.” Id. at 116, 119, 147; see also
Cory R. Liu, Note, Textualism and the Presumption of Reasonable Drafting, 38 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 711, 721 (2015) (“By giving primacy to the text and using evidence of
purpose only to resolve ambiguities, modern textually-constrained purposivists can also be
characterized as discerning how a reasonable reader would understand the text of the
statute.”).
25 See Re, supra note 10, at 408 n.4 (“The New Purposivism [i.e., textually
constrained purposivism] resembles the New Textualism in that it honors clear text, viewing
it as a ‘trump’ . . . .”).
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the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to
the particular dispute in the case. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory
language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent.’” 26 Indeed, in many cases, the Court begins and ends with a
reading of the plain text.27 But, in the hardest cases, the language is not
conclusive. Still, it is only when the text is ambiguous that judges look to
other considerations. As Judge Easterbrook explained, “Knowing the
purpose behind a rule may help a court decode an ambiguous text, but first
there must be some ambiguity.” 28 Thus, under textually constrained
purposivism, judges must first establish ambiguity, and only then consider
other sources.
Amid this backdrop of varied interpretation techniques, the Court in
King introduced contextually constrained purposivism. In this approach,
the statute’s overall purpose is the chief tool a judge uses to understand a
supposedly disputed provision in the statute—even a plainly worded
provision. Judges under this approach begin with the text of the provision
at hand, but will still look to the context, or surrounding provisions and
structure of the statute, as well as extra-textual considerations, to determine
that disputed provision’s meaning. In this way, the approach differs from
textually constrained purposivism in that even a plainly worded provision
can be read in a different way. Section A of this Part provides an in-depth
look at King: detailing the case’s factual background, explaining the
procedural history, and clarifying the central issue. It also describes the
history of health care reform and the reasons why Congress passed the
ACA. Section B then analyzes Chief Justice John Roberts’s majority
opinion and argues that the Court employed a new approach to statutory
interpretation: contextually constrained purposivism. The Court primarily
used purpose to find ambiguity in what was plain text, and then utilized
purpose again to resolve the ambiguity. All the while, it looked to the
context surrounding the challenged statutory provision to find ambiguity
and ascertain the larger purpose of the statute.
26 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ron
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)). The Court has time and again explained this
cardinal rule of interpretation: “We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction
that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a
clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive.” Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980).
27 See YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 2 (2008).
28 Nat’l Tax Credit Partners, L.P. v. Havlik, 20 F.3d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1994) (first
citing Sundstrand Corp. v. Comm’r, 17 F.3d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1994); then citing Calderon
v. Witvoet, 999 F.2d 1101, 1104 (7th Cir. 1993); then citing Lincoln v. Virgil, 508 U.S. 182,
191 (1993); and then citing Puerto Rico Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp.,
485 U.S. 495, 501 (1988)).
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A. Summary of the Facts and Procedural History
Before the ACA, many people were unable to afford health
insurance. 29 Congress passed the ACA to combat two problems: first, a
potential “economic ‘death spiral’” 30 of rising health care insurance costs
and, second, to expand access to health care insurance for as many people
as possible. 31 One of the main causes of this death spiral was the
phenomenon of “adverse selection.” 32 In general, health insurance
involves pooling risk, or transferring costs from high-cost insureds (who
are the most sick) to low-cost insureds (who are the least sick) through the
medium of the insurance company. 33 In adverse selection, sick people are
more likely than healthy ones to purchase health insurance, driving
insurance costs upwards for all insureds in the pool. 34 For some, the cost of
insurance becomes too high to afford.
The ACA seeks to lower the cost of individual health insurance and
combat adverse selection through a system of three interwoven mandates.35
First, the Act bars insurers from taking a person’s health into account when
deciding to sell health insurance or how much to charge for that
insurance. 36 The second is that the Act requires persons to have health
insurance coverage, or risk making a payment to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). 37 The third is that the Act affords premium tax credits

29 According to political analyst Yuval Levin, there were approximately fifty million
people uninsured when Congress passed the ACA. Yuval Levin, Help the Sick and Reduce
the Debt: The Moral Economy of the Health-Care Debate, WITHERSPOON INST. (Aug. 30,
2011), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/08/3824/.
30 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2486 (2015).
31 See id. at 2485.
32 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 637
(7th ed. 2013). Another main cause of the economic death spiral was a phenomenon called
“moral hazard,” which is the tendency of injured persons to excessively use services for
which they are insured. Id. at 638. Consumers are not cost-sensitive when they do not have
to foot the bill for these services. Id.
33 See id. at 633.
34 See id. at 637.
35 See id. at 540–44; see also King, 135 S. Ct. at 2486–87 (summarizing three
elements of ACA).
36 These are called the “guarantee issue” and “community rating” requirements.
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485. The guaranteed issue requirement bars insurers from denying
coverage to any person because of his or her health, and the community rating requirement
bars insurers from charging a person higher premiums for the same reason. Id.
37 See id. at 2486. This is called the “individual mandate” requirement. Id. at 2502
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Congress sought this requirement to encourage more people to sign
up for health insurance in order to pool risk and make it less costly to pay for high cost
insureds. See id. at 2486 (majority opinion). That is why the individual mandate debate in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012), was
so important, for the mandate was one way to combat adverse selection. As the Court in
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(subsidies) to certain individuals to make health insurance more
affordable. 38 This third mandate is the ACA’s primary strategy for
expanding access. 39 The Act contemplates that the States or the Federal
Government can establish Exchanges, 40 or marketplaces where people can
purchase health insurance.
The main issue in King laid in the realm of these Exchanges. The
ACA, codified in Section 36B of the Tax Code, mandates that only
individuals enrolled in an insurance plan in an Exchange “established by a
State” are entitled to premium tax credits. 41 The Act defines “State” as
“each of the 50 States and the District of Columbia.” 42 Thus, the issue of
statutory interpretation before the Court concerned whether these tax
credits, which are available in State Exchanges, are also available in
Federal Exchanges. The implications of the Court’s interpretation were of
“deep ‘economic and political significance.’” 43 By the time the case
reached the Court, sixteen States and the District of Columbia had
established their own Exchanges, whereas the Government had established
Exchanges in thirty-four. 44 Under a narrow reading of Section 36B,
millions stood to lose their insurance plans should the Court decide that
individuals who had purchased their health insurance through Federal
Exchanges could not receive tax credits.45
King explained, “Congress adopted a coverage requirement to ‘minimize this adverse
selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which
will lower health insurance premiums.’” King, 135 S. Ct. at 2486 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 18091(2)(I) (2012)).
38 Americans earning up to 400 percent of the federal poverty level (calculated to be
$46,680 for an individual and $95,400 for a family of four) are eligible for a tax credit. See
26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(1)(A) (2012); Eligibility for the Premium Tax Credit, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-Act/Individuals-and-Families/Eligibility-for-thePremium-Tax-Credit (last updated Jan. 12, 2016).
39 See FURROW ET AL., supra note 32, at 540 (“The primary strategy of the ACA for
expanding access to health insurance for middle-income Americans is the use of the meanstested tax credits to subsidize the purchase of private health insurance.”).
40 The ACA states that “[a]n Exchange shall be a governmental agency or nonprofit
entity that is established by a State.” 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(1).
41 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A).
42 42 U.S.C. § 18024(d).
43 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp.
v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)).
44 Id. at 2487.
45 The Court in King wrote, “One study predicts that premiums would increase by 47
percent and enrollment would decrease by 70 percent.” Id. at 2493 (citing EVAN SALTZMAN
& CHRISTINA EIBNER, RAND CORP., THE EFFECT OF ELIMINATING THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT’S TAX CREDITS IN FEDERALLY FACILITATED MARKETPLACES 1 (2015),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR900/RR980/RAND_RR98
0.pdf (“Enrollment in the ACA-compliant individual market . . . would decline by 9.6
million, or 70 percent, in federally facilitated marketplace (FFM) states.”)). The Court then
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The procedural history of the case is straightforward. Four Virginia
residents, who did not want to purchase health insurance or make a
payment to the IRS, brought an action challenging the ACA. 46 The
petitioners argued that the Act only granted tax credits to individuals who
purchased insurance from State Exchanges, not Federal ones.47 The district
court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss. 48 The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 49 On the same day in a different case, the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the Act restricted tax credits
to State Exchanges only. 50 The Court granted the challengers’ petition for
a writ of certiorari in order to resolve the circuit split.
B. The Majority Opinion’s Use of Contextually Constrained Purposivism
Writing for the majority, 51 Chief Justice Roberts held that premium
tax credits are available to both State and Federal Exchanges under Section
36B. 52 His opinion proceeds in roughly two parts. First, he discusses the
history of health care reform in the United States and why Congress
implemented the ACA. Then, he engages in contextually constrained
purposivism to understand the meaning of the challenged provision. Chief
Justice Roberts reads ambiguity into what is a plainly written provision by
looking to the purpose of the statute and the context surrounding the
provision. To resolve the ambiguity, he again looks to purpose provided by
the context of the statute’s enactment. 53

cited another study that “predict[ed] that premiums would increase by 35 percent and
enrollment would decrease by 69 percent.” Id. at 2493–94 (citing LINDA J. BLUMBERG ET
AL., URBAN INST., THE IMPLICATIONS OF A SUPREME COURT FINDING FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN
KING V. BURWELL: 8.2 MILLION MORE UNINSURED AND 35% HIGHER PREMIUMS 1 (2015),
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2015/rwjf417289 (“We estimate
that a victory for the plaintiff would increase the number of uninsured in 34 states by 8.2
million people . . . .”)).
46 Id. at 2487.
47 See id.
48 Id. at 2488.
49 Id.
50 Id.; see Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 404–05 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
51 The case was decided by six votes to three, with Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joining the majority
opinion. Justice Antonin Scalia authored the dissent, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas
and Samuel Alito. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2484.
52 Id. at 2496.
53 This is not the first time the Court engaged in contextually constrained
purposivism. See Re, supra note 10, at 409–13, for a discussion of cases, including Bond v.
United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014), and Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
However, the Court has not uniformly applied the approach. See Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014), for a recent example where the Court chose to
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Chief Justice Roberts begins the opinion by focusing on the history
and purpose surrounding the ACA. The first line is telling: “The [ACA]
adopts a series of interlocking reforms designed to expand coverage in the
individual health insurance market.” 54 The immediate focus on why
Congress passed the ACA—to expand access to health insurance—
supports the notion that this purpose is the most important consideration.
He then spends three pages highlighting the history of health care reform,
explaining how these reforms sought to combat an economic death spiral. 55
He also mentions how Massachusetts prevented the spiral by passing health
care reform that significantly expanded coverage to all but 2.6% of the
state’s residents. 56 It was a great success, no doubt one Congress tried to
replicate by passing the ACA. 57
After discussing the history and purpose of the ACA, 58 Chief Justice
Roberts commences his statutory analysis of Section 36B. 59 At first, he
appears to apply a new textualist method by making it seem like text is of
paramount concern: “We begin with the text of Section 36B.” 60 But later
in the opinion, it is evident that purpose is his most important
consideration. He analyzes the language of Section 36B in depth for over
three pages to determine what an “Exchange established by the State”
means. 61 He readily admits, “If the statutory language is plain, we must
enforce it according to its terms” and later, “Petitioners’ arguments about
the plain meaning of Section 36B are strong.” 62 Under the plain meaning,
only individuals who purchased insurance from State Exchanges would
receive tax credits. A new textualist or textually constrained purposivist
would start and end with the letter of the provision. 63

take a textualist approach to understand a provision—even though the Legislature would
have probably rejected the interpretation.
54 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485.
55 See id. at 2485–87.
56 Id. at 2486.
57 See id. (“The [ACA] adopts a version of the three key reforms that made the
Massachusetts system successful.”).
58 Chief Justice Roberts spends part of his opinion discussing whether the IRS had the
authority to interpret the provision, but for purposes of this Case Comment, it will not be
detailed. See id. at 2488–89.
59 See id. at 2489.
60 Id.
61 See id. at 2489–92.
62 Id. at 2489, 2495 (citing Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242,
251 (2010)).
63 For an illustration of what a new textualist or textually constrained judge would do,
see Justice Scalia’s concurrence in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2592 (2014)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Constitution’s Recess
Appointments Clause, whose meaning was in contention, should have been resolved based
on its seemingly clear text, without regard to its purpose).
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But Chief Justice Roberts is neither. 64 Instead, he looks to two
sources to determine that the provision is ambiguous: context and, more
importantly, purpose. Chief Justice Roberts first looks to the context. 65 He
analyzes Section 36B by reading other provisions and the structure of the
Act. 66 These other provisions contemplate there being qualified individuals
who merit tax credits in every type of Exchange—including Federal. For
example, Section 18041 dictates that if States choose not to establish an
Exchange, the Government will establish “such Exchange.” 67 Using
Black’s Law Dictionary, Chief Justice Roberts finds that this phrase means
that if States do not establish Exchanges, the Government will step in to
establish the same type of Exchange. 68 He then looks to two other
provisions, one mandating that “all Exchanges ‘shall make available
qualified health plans to qualified individuals,’” 69 and another mandating
for “all Exchanges to create outreach programs that must ‘distribute fair
and impartial information concerning . . . the availability of premium tax
credits under section 36B.” 70 Chief Justice Roberts concludes, “If tax
credits were not available on Federal Exchanges, these provisions would
make little sense.” 71 They presuppose the availability of tax credits for
Federal Exchanges.

64 In fact, Chief Justice Roberts never has been. In his confirmation hearings, he lays
out his philosophy on statutory interpretation: “You begin with the text, and as the Supreme
Court has said, in many cases, perhaps most cases, that’s also where you end. The answer is
clear. I have, though, as a judge, relied on legislative history to help clarify ambiguity in the
text.” Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John. G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 319
(2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
65 Chief Justice Roberts explains, “[M]eaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or
phrases may only become evident when placed in context.” King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489
(quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)).
66 He writes, “[W]e ‘must do our best, bearing in mind the fundamental canon of
statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a
view to their place in the overall statutory scheme [i.e., structure].’” Id. at 2492 (quoting
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014)). For a discussion of the
importance of utilizing structure in statutory interpretation, see generally Kenneth W. Starr,
Of Forests and Trees: Structuralism in the Interpretation of Statutes, 56 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 703 (1987).
67 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
68 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (“By using the phrase ‘such Exchange,’ Section 18041
instructs the Secretary to establish and operate the same Exchange that the State was
directed to establish under Section 18031.”) (citing Such, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1661
(10th ed. 2014) (defining “such” as “[t]hat or those; having just been mentioned”)).
69 Id. at 2490 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(2)(A)).
70 Id. at 2491 (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18031(i)(3)(B)).
71 Id. at 2492. Chief Justice Roberts also mentions other provisions that would not
make sense if tax credits were not available for Federal Exchanges. See id. at 2489–92. For
a study detailing over fifty provisions of the ACA that would not make sense if Federal
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Second, Chief Justice Roberts reads ambiguity into Section 36B by
considering the purpose of the statute. He maintains that he only reads
ambiguity into the provision by using context, but it is evident by the latter
part of the opinion that he also utilizes purpose. 72 Though he never
explicitly states this, he hints at it: “But while the meaning of the phrase . . .
may seem plain ‘when viewed in isolation,’ such a reading turns out to be
‘untenable in light of [the statute] as a whole.’”73 His subsequent focus on
the purpose of the statute to determine the true meaning of the provision
suggests that purpose drove him to find the provision ambiguous in the first
place.
After finding ambiguity in the statutory language, Chief Justice
Roberts resolves that ambiguity by again looking to purpose. He writes,
“Here, the statutory scheme compels us to reject petitioners’ interpretation
because it would destabilize the individual insurance market in any State
with a Federal Exchange, and likely create the very ‘death spirals’ that
Congress designed the Act to avoid.” 74 No doubt, Congress’s reason for
passing the ACA drives his interpretation of what Section 36B was
supposed to originally say. Chief Justice Roberts ended his opinion with
what seems like a confession:
[W]e must respect the role of the Legislature, and take care not to undo
what it has done. A fair reading of legislation demands a fair
understanding of the legislative plan.
Congress passed the [ACA] to improve health insurance markets, not
to destroy them. If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way
that is consistent with the former, and avoids the latter. Section 36B
can fairly be read consistent with what we see as Congress’s plan, and
75
that is the reading we adopt.

Exchanges did not receive tax credits, see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & James Engstrand,
Anomalies in the Affordable Care Act that Arise from Reading the Phrase “Exchange
Established by the State” Out of Context, 23 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 249, 260–66 (2015).
72 He proclaims, “In this instance, the context and structure of the Act compel us to
depart from what would otherwise be the most natural reading of the pertinent statutory
phrase.” King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495.
73 Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Dep’t of Revenue v. ACF
Indus., 510 U.S. 332, 343 (1994)).
74 Id. at 2492–93 (citing N.Y. State Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405,
419–20 (1973)).
75 Id. at 2496 (emphasis added). One commentator exclaimed that these were the
most important words of the opinion, “sounding the death-knell . . . for the Scalian
revolution in statutory interpretation.” Marty Lederman, Textualism? Purposivism? The
Chief Justice Comes Down on the Side of Interpretive Pragmatism, SLATE (June 25, 2015,
4:26
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2015/scotus_r
oundup/supreme_court_2015_john_roberts_ruling_in_king_v_burwell.html.
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In short, Chief Justice Roberts utilized contextually constrained
purposivism to determine the meaning of Section 36B. Though the text of
the provision was plain, he found ambiguity in it by looking to context—
the provisions surrounding Section 36B and the statute’s structure—as well
as purpose. He then used the purpose of the statute again to ascertain the
meaning of Section 36B. The main difference between contextually
constrained purposivism and textually constrained purposivism is that the
former approach disregards the plain meaning of the disputed provision if
context and the purpose of the statute conflict with that plain meaning. A
textually constrained purposivist judge, however, does not consider context
or overall purpose if the meaning of the disputed provision is plain. Thus,
contextually constrained purposivism is a novel, albeit hybrid, purposivist
technique. It falls short of classical purposivism because text still plays an
important role—judges first look to the text, not the statute’s overall
purpose, to understand meaning. Interestingly, Chief Justice Roberts does
not rely on the ACA’s legislative history to ascertain purpose, but that may
be more because it was not readily available. 76 Under contextually
constrained purposivism, it would not be surprising if the Court also looks
to legislative history in order to better understand why Congress passed a
statute. After all, legislative history is a rich source—and marque
technique—for any purposivist. 77
II.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONTEXTUALLY CONSTRAINED PURPOSIVISM

What are the implications of the Court’s new method of
interpretation? Does it remain true to the Court’s role as Congress’s
supposed agent? Or does it distort Congress’s true intentions, negatively
impacting the democratic process? May it also invite too much judicial
discretion, bringing to mind fears of justices imposing their own views into
laws? This Part seeks to analyze these questions in depth, postulating the
advantages and disadvantages of this new approach.
A. The Positive Implications of Contextually Constrained Purposivism
Contextually constrained purposivism appears to take the best
elements from both purposivism and textually constrained purposivism:
judges may consider both the purpose and the text to figure a provision’s
See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492.
Looking to legislative history would seem to help the purposivist in finding
Congress’s true intent in passing a certain provision. For an excellent discussion regarding
the benefits of using legislative history, see generally Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 848–61 (1992). But see
Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371,
375–79 (offering a brief rebuttal regarding some of the concerns of using of legislative
history).
76
77
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meaning. 78
Even though purpose is the judge’s most important
consideration, the text still curtails a judge’s analysis to a degree. As
Professor Re explains, “On the up side, [contextually constrained
purposivism] offers a way of preserving distinctly textual constraints on
interpretation while also leaving analytical room to give in to the
persuasive force of purposivism . . . .” 79 Even though text is an important
consideration, a judge can deviate from it in special circumstances, like in
King, to effectuate the true purpose of the statute.
Utilizing contextually constrained purposivism arguably allows the
Court to be a more faithful agent of Congress. Under the approach, the
Court takes into account the wider purpose of the statute, as opposed to the
immediate meaning of a single provision. In this way, it may be that the
Court respects the true intent of Congress and, consequently, the American
structure of representative democracy. The Court in King believed that it
most respected the will of the people when it tried to interpret Section 36B
in light of the statute’s overall purpose. Chief Justice Roberts highlighted
the Court’s facilitative role in the democratic process: “In a democracy, the
power to make the law rests with those chosen by the people. Our role is
more confined—‘to say what the law is.’. . . [W]e must respect the role of
the Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has done.” 80 The Court
read Section 36B broadly in order to not undo what it believed the people
wanted: more access to health insurance. Due to Congress passing statutes
like the ACA that have headings indicating the explicit goal(s),81 it seems
like contextually constrained purposivism is a germane way for finding the
right meaning of a disputed provision.
Similarly, if the Court takes care to effectuate only Congress’s will,
there should be less risk of judges imposing their own subjective moral
philosophies into the meaning of provisions. Congress’s purpose is the
guidepost (alongside considerations like text, context, legislative history,
and more) that the Court follows when fulfilling its judicial function of
“say[ing] what the law is.” 82 In theory, this additional guidepost should
curtail judges’ ability to impute their own moral values and beliefs into the
text.

78 As Professor Re writes, “[Contextually constrained purposivism] strives to get the
best of both worlds. It aims to adhere to clear text when it’s the product of deliberate
compromise, but not when it springs from an inattentive mistake.” Re, supra note 10, at
418.
79 Id.
80 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
81 For instance, the first heading of the ACA is: “Quality, Affordable Health Care for
All Americans.” Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1, 124
Stat. 119, 119 (2010).
82 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
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Finally, by reading provisions in light of the statute’s greater purpose,
the Court is able to fix ambiguous or seemingly contradictory provisions to
avoid absurd results. 83 The Court in King believed it was doing this. Had
the Court read Section 36B narrowly and held that only State Exchanges
merited tax credits, millions of Americans would have lost health
insurance—an absurd result contradicting the statute’s purpose of
expanding access to health insurance.84 Although it seems like the Court
rewrote Section 36B to say, an Exchange established by the State and
Federal Government, 85 the Court insisted it did no rewriting. 86 Instead, it
was merely reading the provision that way in order to make it coherent with
Congress’s greater purpose.
B. The Negative Implications of Contextually Constrained Purposivism
While contextually constrained purposivism may appear to have many
advantages, it is by no means flawless. First, the approach may actually
invite too much judicial discretion. Judges can impose their own values
and beliefs under the pretense that they are imposing the purpose of the
statute. 87 Instead of purpose being a useful guidepost that constrains the
Court’s interpretation, its use can lead to manipulation. As Justice Scalia
remarked in his dissent in King, “More importantly, the Court forgets that
ours is a government of laws and not of men. That means we are governed
by the terms of our laws, not by the unenacted will of our lawmakers.” 88 It
is easier for a judge to impose his or her own will into a provision’s reading
under a purposivist approach rather than textualist. Any reviewer of a
83 For more on this idea, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479 (1987) (arguing that judges should interpret
statutes dynamically—“that is, in light of their present societal, political, and legal
context”). Professor Eskridge argues that judges are relational agents who should use their
best efforts to carry out the general goals of the legislature. Since circumstances change
over time, it is up to judge to keep the law updated for the legislature. See id. at 1480,
1544–45.
84 The Court wrote, “So without the tax credits, the coverage requirement would
apply to fewer individuals. And it would be a lot fewer. . . . It is implausible that Congress
meant the Act to operate in this manner.” King, 135 S. Ct. at 2493–94 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2674 (2012) (joint dissent)).
85 See id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Who would ever have dreamt that
‘Exchange established by the State’ means ‘Exchange established by the State or the
Federal Government’?”); see also 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012) (providing monthly
premiums for qualified health plans “which were enrolled in through an Exchange
established by the State.” (emphasis added)).
86 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495–96.
87 As Professor Re notes, “On the down side, [contextually constrained purposivism]
affords the Court even greater power and discretion . . . increas[ing] the risk of biased,
insincere, and unexpected rulings.” Re, supra note 10, at 418.
88 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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judge’s textualist reading only needs to see the words of a statute to
determine if the judge followed them. Justice Scalia wrote many
disparaging remarks in his dissent in King, but none more critical than this:
“And the cases will publish forever the discouraging truth that the Supreme
Court of the United States favors some laws over others, and is prepared to
do whatever it takes to uphold and assist its favorites.” 89
The primary consideration in contextually constrained purposivism is
Congress’s purpose. Yet how are judges sure they know it? There are 535
members of Congress; each one might have a different reason for yelling
“yea.” As Professor Max Radin explained, “There are purposes and
purposes.” 90 In King, the Court reminded petitioners that the purpose of
the ACA was to expand access to health insurance. After all, Title I of the
ACA reads: “Quality, Affordable Health Care for All Americans.”91 But,
should every provision be read in light of this one purpose? Or might
provisions reflect different purposes? At what level of generality should
the Court frame the purpose? Petitioners made a plausible argument for the
purpose of Section 36B: to compel the States to establish Exchanges, in
order for their citizens to get tax credits.92 How is the Court so sure this is
not the true purpose of Section 36B?
Another criticism is that the approach discourages judges from being
faithful agents of Congress. Judges are not faithful when they impose their
own will into statutes or miss the reason(s) the statute was passed. They
also are not faithful when they look to extra-textual considerations to
determine purpose. Justice Scalia argues that the Court in most
circumstances should deduce purpose from text: “The purposes of a law
must be ‘collected chiefly from its words,’ not ‘from extrinsic

89 Id. at 2507. Due to the Court’s “favoritism” of the ACA, Justice Scalia, now rather
(in)famously, wrote: “We should start calling this law SCOTUScare.” Id. If the Court did
indeed play favorites with the ACA, was it not being candid when it read Section 36B
broadly? Did it perhaps do so for political reasons? See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of
Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 731 (1987) (“The scholar’s obligation is to ‘think,
lucidly and openly,’ about the issues; the judge must act in a manner sensitive to political
and other realities and thus may opt for something less, or least different.” (quoting GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 181 (1982)).
90 Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 876 (1930)
(explaining that “[w]e distinguish in our conduct and our thinking between immediate and
ulterior purposes.”).
91 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1, 124 Stat.
119, 119 (2010).
92 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2494. Justice Scalia agrees with petitioners. Establishing
and running an Exchange is a costly process. If it were not for the tax credits, why would
States elect to establish Exchanges in the first place? See id. at 2504 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“A State would have much less reason to take on these burdens [i.e., establishing an
Exchange] if its citizens could receive tax credits no matter who establishes its Exchange.”).
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circumstances.’” 93 As Justice Scalia noted in another case, “[T]he purpose
of a statute includes not only what it sets out to change, but also what it
resolves to leave alone.” 94 Judges violate Congress’s intent when they
delve behind the words in the law. They instantly change the meaning by
looking to any other source than the text. By “fixing” ambiguous or
seemingly contradictory provisions, the Court is interfering with the
provision Congress meant to pass. In this day and age, it takes great
legislative compromise to decide on the passing of a statute—perhaps these
poorly worded provisions are supposed to be that way. 95 When the Court
“fixes” the meaning of such provisions, it hurts the democratic process.
When judges change the plain meaning of laws, they not only violate
their roles as agents, they also violate the principle of separation of powers.
An unhappy Justice Scalia criticized the Court for stepping into the
Legislature’s boundary:
The Court’s decision reflects the philosophy that judges should endure
whatever interpretive distortions it takes in order to correct a supposed
flaw in the statutory machinery. That philosophy ignores the American
people’s decision to give Congress “[a]ll legislative Powers”
enumerated in the Constitution. They made Congress, not this Court,
96
responsible for both making laws and mending them.

By usurping the Legislature’s role to make laws, the Court
aggrandizes its own power. It rewrote the phrase “Established by the
State” effectively seven times—that is how often the phrase appeared in the
ACA. 97 The Court also encourages “congressional lassitude.” 98 The Court
93 Id. at 2503 (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202
(1819)). He reiterates that “[o]ur task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it.” Id. at
2505 (quoting Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989)
(alteration in original)). Justice Scalia maintains that the Court is only allowed to improve
the text when there is a “patently obvious” scrivener’s error: “Only when it is patently
obvious to a reasonable reader that a drafting mistake has occurred may a court correct the
mistake.” Id. at 2504–05. For one example of a court fixing a scrivener’s error, see
Cernauskas v. Fletcher, 201 S.W.2d 999, 1000 (Ark. 1947), where the court read the words
“in conflict herewith” into a statute that stated, “All laws and parts of laws . . . are hereby
repealed.” The court explained: “No doubt the legislature meant to repeal all laws in
conflict with that act, and, by error of the author or the typist, left out the usual words ‘in
conflict herewith.’” Id.
94 W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) (citing Rodriguez v.
United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (per curiam)).
95 See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 4, at 54 (“[L]aws will be messy, uneven,
and ill-fitting with their apparent purposes not because Congress is short-sighted or
imprecise, but rather because legislation entails compromise, and compromise is untidy by
nature.”).
96 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1).
97 See id. at 2499.
98 Id. at 2506.
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basically gave the drafters, who engaged in “inartful drafting,” 99 a get-outof-jail-free card. What impetus does Congress now have to not continue
writing legislation sloppily?
CONCLUSION
In King, Justice Scalia criticized the majority’s interpretive approach,
exclaiming, “Today’s interpretation is not merely unnatural; it is unheard
of.” 100 Justice Scalia’s critique is persuasive, because the Court employed
an entirely new method of statutory interpretation: contextually constrained
purposivism. This method has emerged in only the last few years,
harkening back to a classical era of interpretation where the Court read
statutes in light of their purpose. Nowhere is this approach more evident
than in King, where the Court had to grapple with one of the most storied
debates facing the judiciary: whether to interpret a provision according to
its spirit, or letter. The Court, in the face of plainly worded text, decided to
effectuate the spirit of the statute. This was to the dismay of textualists,
none more so than Justice Scalia, but to the joy of millions who could now
continue to afford health insurance.
The Court in King used contextually constrained purposivism to
broadly interpret Section 36B. It looked to the context surrounding the
provision to read ambiguity into it. By looking to other provisions that
assumed tax credits were available on Federal Exchanges, the Court
surmised that the provision did not make sense. What is more, the Court
looked at the effects of interpreting the provision narrowly, finding it
would be contrary to the ACA’s purpose for millions to lose their health
insurance. Determining that the provision was open-ended, the Court then
looked to the statute’s purpose to make sense of it. The Court’s actions
were self-serving—after having just used purpose to initially find
ambiguity, the Court would use purpose again to resolve it. In light of the
ACA’s true purpose to expand access to health insurance, the Court held
that the phrase “an Exchange established by the State” should have been
written, for all intents and purposes: “an Exchange established by the State
[and Federal Government].”
How the Court reached its holding has possibly great implications.
For one, it suggests the Court believes it is acting as a faithful agent of
Congress when it corrects inartful drafting in light of a statute’s purpose.

99 Id. at 2492 (majority opinion). Congress’s “inartful drafting” of the ACA brings to
mind a description by Roger Traynor, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California,
regarding the many statutes that came before his court: “Ordinarily what passes before
judges on the reviewing stand is not a well-programmed, orderly parade, but fragments from
a circus on the loose.” Roger J. Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IOWA L. REV.
1, 2 (1977).
100 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Text still plays an important, constraining role. Even though the Court
disregarded the plain wording of Section 36B, it still looked to context to
make sure that its new interpretation would be consistent with the ACA as
a whole. Though this Case Comment takes no sides in whether the Court
interpreted the provision correctly, the Court’s interpretation does make
sense if Congress’s true goal was to expand access to health insurance.
Did the Court in King finally find a Holy Grail methodology for
interpreting statutes? A foolproof method that can be used in any case
under any circumstance? Probably not. When it comes to interpretation,
perhaps there exist so many modes because the subject of interpretation,
human language, is imprecise.101 Maybe this very human, very imperfect
exercise called speaking is to blame for why there will never be just one
method of interpretation. As John Locke once wrote long ago regarding
interpretation: “[T]here is no end; comments beget comments, and
explications make new matter for explications; and of limiting,
distinguishing, varying the signification of . . . moral words there is no end.
These ideas of men’s making are, by men still having the same power,
multiplied in infinitum.” 102

101 This brings to mind Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s wise observation regarding
the very enterprise of law itself: “The danger of which I speak is . . . the notion that a given
system, ours, for instance, can be worked out like mathematics from some general axioms of
conduct.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465
(1897).
102 2 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 109 (Alexander
Campbell Fraser ed., Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1959) (1690).

